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1. INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes a new model for dealing with environ-
mental degradation caused by mining activities in developing
countries.' The proposal has two core elements. One is to
assure that the appropriation of mineral wealth from future
generations is at least not accompanied by unpaid environmen-
tal liabilities caused by prior generations' mining activities.
The other is to structure a way to provide foreign aid to
mining countries in cases where they simply cannot afford to
take corrective action themselves. The model identifies which
nations, if any, ought to provide remedial foreign aid. Further,
it calls for a broad consensus on matters of principle rather
than on treaty negotiations.
This writing does not address the question of the intergen-
erational inequity implied by mining, in the sense that it
permanently removes resources from a country.2 Also, the
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; B.A., M.B.A., Columbia University.
Professor, University of Houston Law Center. My thanks to Professor
Sanford Gaines, Ayesha Dias, Christopher Hinde, Kwabena Mate, Olle
Ostensen, W.G. Selassie and Thomas Waelde for their thoughtful review of
an earlier draft of this Article.
1 Conceptually, this proposed model can also be applied to other
resource-related activities.
' The intergenerational inequity implied by mining is usually treated
under the heading of "sustainable development." This term was apparently
coined in the Brundtland Report. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEv.,
OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). Sustainable development means
"development thatmeets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Id That is a rather
general concept. This paper in effect sharpens the concept with respect to
mining.
(181)
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resolution this Article proposes does not conform to the radical
version of intergenerational equity in which present genera-
tions have obligations to future generations in other coun-
tries.'
The argument for the expansive view of intergenerational
equity is that (1) future generations in wealthier countries will
ultimately gain from a collectively healthy planet, and (2) "all
members of the present generation are entitled to equal access
to the [planetary] legacy."' Because it is such a short step
from this position to the politically unmanageable proposition
that we need an immediate global redistribution of wealth to
equalize all people, the broad version appears insupportable as
a practical matter.
2. PERVASIVENESS OF THE ISSUE
The average industrial nation consumer buys an array of
goods and packaging in a busy, competitive marketplace. The
variation in prices of the same goods are often considerable,
and they are generally dependent upon how much time the
consumer is willing to commit to shop analytically, the season
of the year, and whether he lives in a large city or a remote
location. The consumer will almost surely never recognize
that many of the metals in the objects he purchases were made
at bargain prices. The bargains arose because many metal
exporting countries are oversupplying their products and
selling them into a cold-blooded world market over which they
had no control as to price.' In large measure such countries
can oversupply because the minerals are produced under
environmentally lax standards, thereby cutting costs and
increasing sales. To take a homely example, consider the
3 See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
26-27 (1988) (presenting the argument in favor of that sweeping concept).
4 I& at 28. Perhaps I do not understand the meaning of the author's
discussion; if so I apologize for my error.
" Generally, efforts to organize export blocs in basic minerals have failed
miserably. Significant examples include the tin exporters group and the
copper exporters group. See Tin Market Collapse: Market Regulators as a
Risk Factor in Mining Project--the Case of in, MINING MAG., Jan. 1989, at
37; Jonathan Power, The Idea of 'Resource War' Has a Last Fling in the
Gulf, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 1987, pt. 2, at 7 (discussing the
weakness of the copper cartel).
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consumer's cans made from Bolivian tin or Jamaican bauxite.
The prices of these cans reflect an implicit subsidy in the form
of costs not yet paid for in extracting and processing the
minerals. Production costs would most likely be higher if the
minerals came from the consumer's country due to the
imposition of more rigorous standards there.
This persistent problem is getting the attention of policy
thinkers in multinational agencies, especially the United
Nations ("UN").6 Given the rapid growth of environmental
awareness around the world and ominous issues of global
warming and ozone depletion, mining practices in developing
countries have been relegated to a status that borders on being
a mere curiosity. In fact, the issue is critical to the well-being
of future generations of those countries. Turning a blind eye
to the issue now hastens the day of reckoning when the
resources become depleted and there are major unpaid
environmental liabilities arising from prior years when the
mines were active. Little is being done to address the issue
and the clock is ticking.
2.1. Perspective
Few people in the industrialized world give Third World'
mining much thought, except perhaps for concerns about
global warming. Otherwise, such mining has no immediate
impact outside the country where the mine is located. In fact,
it is slightly heartening in that it provides foreign exchange
that might lighten local debt burdens. Moreover, the industri-
alized world generally views mining as a mature industry that
needs significant environmental regulation if it is to be as
environmentally sound as the industries that buy its products.
By contrast, mining in the Third World is often a dynamic,
dominant industry which contributes immensely. to national
income but is subject to minimal environmental regulation.
' For example, the UN has an Environment Programme ("UNEP") whose
head office is Nairobi, but whose Industry and Environment Programme
Activity Center, the part that deals the most with industry, is located in
Paris. The Paris Center is concerned with mining and has a United Nations
Development Programme ("UNDP") which supports a revolving fund for
natural resources exploration.
" The terms "Third World," "less developed countries," "developing
countries," and "South" refer to the poorer countries of the world.
1992]
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This Article is written with a strong preference for microec-
onomic analysis as opposed to philosophical reasoning. As
such, it contains a cold-blooded materialistic tract. I believe
that the best way in a political sense to achieve practical
results is by appeals to reason and basic concepts of economic
equity, as opposed to more abstract approaches. There are
references to such higher principles throughout this Article,
but they are largely treated as anomalies. In the present state
of affairs, such concepts are unsettled ideals, somewhat like a
horizon toward which a person sails indefinitely but which is
never attained.8 That moral horizon is very important, but
not of immediate concern to a crew that is trying to maneuver
the ship out of a dangerous shoal.
This Article arises out of impressions gained at a week-long
United Nations conference held in Berlin in June of 1991. It
reflects many of the thoughts shared by mining and environ-
mental experts from East Asia, South America and Africa and
technicians from the industrialized world, especially the
United States and Europe. The product of the meeting was
the adoption of guidelines for environmental behavior in
regard to Third World mining.
2.2. Environmental Impact of Mining
Mining compromises the environment. The immediate
process itself tends to be noisy, dusty, water-intensive and
frequently dangerous to human and animal health.' Explora-
tion activities are rarely a significant environmental problem,
since the primary activities are aerial mapping, searches for
outcroppings, core sampling, and detonation of minor seismic
explosives.1" The developmental and operational stages,
however, pose serious problems. They typically include large
scale clearing of vegetation and topsoil. Thereafter, there may
' Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia, used this metaphor in
addressing the United States Congress, speaking admiringly of the fact that
the Congress had been sailing toward the horizon of democracy for over 200
years. Michael Oreskes, American Politics Loses Way as Polls Supplant
Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, § 1, at 1.
9 See generally ECONOMICS OF THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES (William A.
Vogely ed., 4th ed. 1985).
,0 For some fragile environments, such as the Namib desert, even these
activities can be destructive.
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be extensive extraction in relation to the mineral yield. For
example, a ratio of 1000 units of waste for each unit of mineral
is not unrealistic for precious minerals. In the case of gold, a
ratio of 10 grams per ton, or 10 parts per million, is considered
good. The implications of such huge quantities of waste
materials (also known as tailings) can be highly adverse,
because the tailings commonly include contaminants used to
extract the minerals. For example, in some cases cyanide
lakes form (cyanide is used as a leaching agent) with devastat-
ing results for wildlife."
The recovery stage can be even worse. Refining and
smelting typically cause significant air pollution, which can
lead to desertification, especially in the case of sulphurous gas
emissions from copper smelting. Perhaps the most disturbing
process of all is acid leaching, in which acids are percolated
through core dumps, capturing and precipitating the sought-
after mineral. Unless stringent rules are applied, miners have
little motive to stop the waste acid from running off into the
local environment. The long-term environmental implications
include morbidity among workers and the accumulation of
toxic sludge and tailings that gradually work their way into
the general environment. Further, toxic sludge and tailings
can be contained only with great expense and trouble. It is
debatable whether many of these by-products can ever be
disposed of safely; heavy metals such as lead and cadmium are
the leading examples."2 Finally, in order to return the land
to productive use, the mining site must be reclaimed. In the
case of subsurface mines, the mine must be safely sealed.'"
n Anyone allowing cyanide lakes to form is also engaged in poor
economics because of the cost of cyanide. The same applies to waste heaps
that are leached with acid. However, and more serious, acid water (which
often contains heavy metals) can run off from waste heaps and into surface
and ground water if the ore has a high sulfide content and the waste heaps
are not properly situated and insulated.
"2 See Mining Firm Stops Dumping Metal Wastes into Mediterranean;
Land Burial Planned, 13 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 157 (Apr. 11, 1990) (A
Spanish mining company, Portman Golf S.A., ceased dumping its daily 7,500
metric tons of metal residues into the Mediterranean Sea on March 30, in
compliance with a federal deadline; prior to March 30, the company dumped
lead, cadmium, copper, arsenic, and mercury into the sea.)
iS The United States has an Abandoned Mined Land fee which partially
cures the problem of abandoned coal mine sites. 30 U.S.C. § 1232 (1988).
The fee, which is fairly viewed as a tax by the industry, falls on coal mining
19921
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
In the case of surface mines, the topsoil must be replaced, and
the land must be replanted to prevent its erosion.
Admittedly, there will be differences of opinion as to how
much of the bill must be paid. Wealthy countries can afford to
remove eyesores and would treat the cost of removal as part of
the mineral production price. Less prosperous countries would
consider such cost of removal a luxury. Presumably there are
also differences of opinion as to what constitutes an eyesore.
A central problem is the lack of a single norm of environ-
mental correctness. There may never be one. The debate over
the ethical basis of environmentalism has been raging (with a
corresponding increase in the number of schools of thought) for
decades, and there is little sign that it will abate.' The
problem seems to be that once one passes beyond the Roman's
view that the law is to protect people and their property from
injury, the difficult questions, such as the importance of
aesthetic values and any duties not to extinguish species of
animal life, are susceptible to a number of philosophical
analyses.15
It is possible to dwell on the adverse physical effects of
mining processes at great length, but it is not helpful for the
purposes of this Article. Environmental problems at each
mine site tend to be unique, and therefore, each mine requires
its own specific array of engineering responses. 6 The impor-
tant point is that once a mining project is underway, it is
expensive to upgrade it to meet sound environmental norms.
However, if the host country's legal system permits unsound
environmental practices, environmental costs can be deferred
companies at the rate of $15 for each ton of subsurface coal removed and
$.35 per ton of surface coal removed. The industry considers the fee to be
unfair because it taxes current operators for the past actions of nonexistent
or insolvent miners. See Long-Term Strategies for Programs and Issues
Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee: Hearings Before the House Ways
and Means Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 101-98 (1990) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Greg Thibedeau of Peabody Holding Co., Inc.).
14 See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Earth and Other Ethics: The Institu-
tional Issues, 56 TENN. L. REV. 43 (1988) (discussing the curious lack of
clear philosophical underpinnings for environmental values, particularly in
light of the seemingly clear consensus about the importance of such values).
1d. at 48.
16See, e.g., ERICK SCHANZE ET AL., 2 MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 212-35 (1981); Cyanide Neutralization of Heap Leach Dumps,
MINING J. (ENvTL. SUPP.), Feb. 22, 1991, at 13.
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or even ignored. Such conduct places current miners at risk
and harms future generations of citizens.
In spite of the major long-term costs associated with failing
to identify and internalize the total environmental costs of
mining, for many developing countries, a bill deferred seems
almost as good as a bill unpaid. A large fraction of the
developing country's population is simply unaware of the risks
associated with mining processes. Likewise, to many members
of a current generation, a bill payable by a future generation
is no bill at all or such deferral can be rationalized by focusing
on the current sacrifices of the present generation. However,
the bill eventually either has to be paid" or the population
has to abandon the area.
2.3. ypes of Mining in Developing Countries
There are generally four types of mining in the developing
world: large scale domestic or foreign projects, medium scale
projects, artisanal mining, and "gold rush" mining.19 Each
1 Again, this problem is not unique to the developing world. The United
States government's Savannah River nuclear enrichment facility, which
processes plutonium, has reportedly been mismanaged for years. The result
has been an unascertainable level of leakages and a multibillion dollar
clean-up bill yet to be incurred. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
OF EMERGENCY ACTION TO CONTROL HAZARDOUS WASTES AT ITS SAVANNAH
RIVER NUCLEAR FACILITIES (Nov. 21, 1984).
8 See Court Says Firm Liable for Damages Caused by Defunct Mine, 11
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 533 (Oct. 12, 1988) (The Fukuoka High Court
ordered Sumitomo Mining Co. to pay compensation to nine survivors and the
families of fourteen victims of arsenic poisoning from a mine that closed
twenty-six years ago; this landmark ruling determined that the owner of the
mining rights, when the mine was active, is liable for adverse health effects.
The decision paves the way for poisoning victims to gain compensation from
owners and past owners of nearly 6,000 now defunct mines).
1" These characterizations evolved at a joint meeting of the German
Foundation for International Development and the United Nations
Department of Technical Cooperation and Development ("UNDTCD"). The
meeting was held in Berlin in a roundtable format and involved high-
ranking mining and government personnel from developing countries, UN
personnel, various experts, and the President of Germany, who is also head
of the Institute for European Environmental Policy. The meeting took place
between June 24-28, 1991 (hereinafter the "Berlin Conference"). The results
of the meeting were published in abbreviated form in Guidelines for the
Future, MINING J., July 5, 1991, at 8. The formal product of the meeting
was a set of guidelines captioned "Environmental Management Guidelines
from Mining," a hortatory preamble, and a list of agreed principles for
encouraging improved mining processes and procedures for business
19921
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has its peculiarities.
Large scale mining operations appear to be the least
problematic. There are several reasons for this. The primary
reason seems to be that such activities-especially if they
involve foreign concessions-are arranged well in advance and
are highly visible. Prudent foreign mining operators generally
consider it a good business practice to be environmentally
aware, and there is objective data to support the view that if
a large mining project includes state of the art environmental
controls, the efficiency gains will more than pay for the extra
costs.20 This general precept, however, is not universally
true. A leading example is the Ok Tedi mining project in
Papua New Guinea, which involves a consortium of several
U.S. and European enterprises, as well as the government of
Papua New Guinea. The project has attracted strong criticism
from several groups, including the prominent Starnberg
Institute, for its emission of acid and heavy metals into the
environment.2 Moreover, international mining companies do
occasionally act aggressively, especially by threatening to with-
draw from the host country if they do not get their way.22
Nevertheless, multinational mining corporations have
much to gain by maintaining high standards. Not only can
high environmental standards generally result in major cost
savings,2" but they also appease environmentalists and limit
enterprises and host country governments.
2 See Dr. A. Warhurst, Environmental Management in Mining and
Mineral Processing in Developing Countries: Enterprise Behavior and
National Policies (1991) (unpublished paper distributed at the Berlin
Conference)[hereinafter Warhurst paper]. This paper contained an
empirical study on a large array of modern mining facilities. The study is
important, but should not be exaggerated. It is untested as to retrofitting
practices, and the fact remains that state of the art mining technology is an
aberration in the developing world. More study is needed to reconcile the
Warhurst conclusion and the actual state of affairs.
21 See Starnberg Institute, Economic-Ecological Development in Papua
New Guinea (1991) (unpublished paper presented at the Berlin Conference)
[hereinafter Starnberg Institute paper]. This paper chronicles a financially
and environmentally ill-conceived large scale gold and copper mining project
and the unpleasant relations between the host government and the
multinational mining enterprise.
"' See, e.g., id. at 9 (reports of threatened withdrawal from Ok Tedi
mining venture in Papua New Guinea).
2 See Warhurst paper, supra note 20 (summarizing years of empirical
studies of many mining locations in both developing and industrialized
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the risk of personal injury litigation arising from hazards
created in the host country.24 Curiously, there is a natural
symbiosis between multinational mining corporations and
environmental activists in that the higher the cost of environ-
mental compliance, the fewer the potential participants.
Cumbersome and expensive licensing processes are especially
likely to favor capital rich mining enterprises. Again, large
scale domestic operations tend to be environmentally sound, in
part due to the reasons discussed above,25 but also because
the World Bank 8 and others now condition loans on meeting
environmental norms.27 Other multilateral agencies that
apply environmental guidelines include the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,
the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Commu-
nity ("EC"), the Central American Bank for Economic Integra-
tion, the Pan-American Health Organization, and the Asian
Development Bank.28 Nevertheless, problems of acid deposi-
tion and nitrous oxide emissions plague large projects in
developing countries. South East Asians, for example, suffer
from such problems.29
countries).
24 The Bhopal gas leak disaster in 1984 furnishes the leading example
of the environmental risks of overseas natural resource-related activities.
The case has been largely settled between Union Carbide and the Indian
government for about $470 million, but claims in the U.S. courts continue.
Andrew Blum, The Bhopal Litigation May Linger; Doubts Remain, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 3.
"" See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
26 See ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEV. CTR., MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Jan. 1991); Keith
Bradshaw, Rain Forest Project in Africa Stirs Debate at World Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at A7 (reporting on controversy over rain forests with
an analysis of the World Bank's environmental impact studies).
2 See Ayesha Dias, International Development Agencies, Mining and
Environment in Developing Countries (1991) (unpublished paper distributed
at the Berlin Conference) (showing that multilateral agencies, such as the
World Bank, are not alone in imposing environmental guidelines on the
application offunds for development projects; bilateral agencies, such as the
Canadian International Development Agency, do the same). Nevertheless,
such guidelines are still in their early stages and are little more than
abstractions in regard to monitoring and implementation.
"a See id.
29 See THE ECOLOGIST, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 2222 (report on British
Petroleum's deforestation in Rodondia, Brazil during the course of mining
operations).
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Medium scale domestic mining operations are a major
problem. Since such operations are often undercapitalized,
they often use environmentally unsound processes."0 Aside
from noise and dust which is common to most mining, typical
problems include: improper disposal of poisonous tailings
(often into domestic water supplies), acidic emissions into the
atmosphere, and exposure of workers to unreasonable levels of
risk on the job. These problems call for an injection of capital
and improved technologies. The latter tend to be available
only from the industrial world at great cost."1 Even then,
unless accompanied by thoughtful training programs and
proper monitoring, such technology is potentially fruitless.3 2
Artisanal mining is also problematic. This part of the
industry involves skilled extraction by small operators. Once
the operator has removed the best of the hard minerals, the
site is abandoned, commonly leaving a scarred landscape,
displaced water flows, and rubbish. Controlling this kind of
mining is difficult, but it can be done. Both Ghana and
Morocco"3 seem to have controlled it by taking practical
control of the mining zones, providing good legal title to the
operators, and offering technical advice and assistance. Ghana
has gone a step further. The government is the only buyer of
gold in Ghana. It purchases gold from artisanal miners at a
seven percent discount from the world market price and uses
the savings to fund future reclamation of land. 4
30 This statement, though not supported by specific cases, developed into
a consensus at the Berlin Conference.
"1 The problem is not limited to areas outside of Europe. Newly unified-
Germany is presently struggling with the enormous cost of cleaning up the
East German brown coal industry. This industry has wreaked havoc with
human life and the environment for decades. Joint ventures can greatly
reduce these costs through contributions of technology.
32 See ECONOMICS OF THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES, supra note 9.
" Mohamed Karbid, Secretary General, Ministry of Energy and Mines,
Morocco, Address at the Berlin Conference (June 1991).
"' Kwabena Mate, Senior Legal Officer, Minerals Commission, Ghana,
Address at the Berlin Conference (June 1991). Ghana's 7% tax is purely
administrative. Members of the World Mining Conference reportedly pay
$5 per ounce to a central fund for mining closures. It is interesting that the
gold mining tax in Ghana conforms to what is apparently a deep concept in
Ghanian law. See N.A. OLLENNU, PRINCIPLES OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN GHANA
4 (1962) (quoting Nan Sir Ofori Atta: "I conceive that the land belongs to a
vast family of whom many are dead, some are living, and countless host are
still unborn."). See also WEISS, supra note 3, at 20. One might view
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"Gold rush" mining, as its name implies, entails hordes of
miners descending on a newly discovered mineral zone, almost
invariably in search of gold. Such mining operations tend to
be subject to minimal legal controls and do the same damage
as artisanal mining, but in a more chaotic manner. Moreover,
gold rush miners tend to use mercury to extract the gold, 5
commonly hunching over and inhaling mercury vapors, thereby
poisoning themselves in the process. Brazil and Bolivia offer
well known examples of this phenomenon.
2.4 Environmental Dumping as a Global Issue
The core economic issue is the failure to include proper
environmental safeguards in the cost of mineral output. The
problem of underpriced mineral production is an aspect of
what has recently come to be known outside the United States
as "environmental dumping." The phenomenon arises when
items produced in a country with lax environmental standards
are sold in a country where the domestic industry faces more
stringent environmental controls. For example, there are
widespread fears among European and American manufactur-
ers that disproportionately expensive environmental standards
in the industrialized countries will lead to destructive levels of
environmental dumping by Third World countries.36 Third
World countries may be willing to scrimp on environmental
safeguards to preserve or increase their levels of mineral
production.3" These low standards, in effect, operate as a
concealed financial subsidy. Moreover, if the government of a
country with low standards combines subsidies with tighter
environmental standards, that subsidy enables local manufac-
turers to retain their competitive advantage against foreign
manufacturers who do not receive such subsidies. Unless the
royalties demanded by the host countries in the same light as the Ghanaian
retention, depending on the funds' application.
" See Olaf Malm et al., Mercury Pollution Due to Gold Mining in the
Madeira River Basin, Brazil, 19 AMBIO 1, 11 (1990).
"6 See John Hunt, World Business Community Fears 'Green' Dumping,
FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 1991, at 5.
17 There are no cases where low environmental standards have been
intentionally used to enhance export competitiveness. Instead, governments
resist demands to improve environmental behavior by pointing to the high
cost of improving such behavior.
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host (mining) country makes effective pollution control
mandatory, environmental dumping will never stop without an
external counterforce. The polluter pays principle. is directly
relevant to this dilemma.38
Conversely, there are allegations that some countries are
using stiff environmental rules as an artificial barrier to
foreign imports.3 " According to the Deputy Director-General
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"').
"The connection between trade and the environment can
become the number one trade issue of the 1990s. "41 Even the
United States and Canada are already haunted by this issue
in their mutual dealings.'
The EC seems to be more attuned to these issues than the
United States. The EC is reportedly in the process of develop-
ing concrete proposals for dealing with environmental dump-
ing. One current proposal includes a retaliatory import duty
combined with foreign aid for targets of European trade
8 See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
s See Hunt, supra note 36, at 5.
40 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 4
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969)[hereinafter GATT]. GATT provides a
framework of rules and procedures governing its members. Its central
features are most-favored-nation treatment of signatories' products, national
treatment ofimported products, elimination of quantitative restrictions, and
a notion of reciprocity. The implicit residue is the right to impose protective
customs duties as a means of protection, combined with a built-in plan to
progressively reduce such tariffs. That plan has been implemented by a
series of tariff rounds, the latest of which is known as the "Uruguay Round"
because of its venue in Punta del Esto, Uruguay.
4' Hunt, supra note 36, at 5 (quoting Charles Carlisle, Deputy Director-
General of GATT at a meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce
in Rotterdam). Hunt's article also describes a recent test case before the
European Court which involved a Danish law that required beer and soft
drinks to be sold only in returnable bottles with a compulsory deposit.
Brewers from other countries claimed that the cost of recycling bottles
eliminated their profits in Denmark, while the Danes could still export their
beer to countries which had no such restrictions. The European
Commission's complaint to the European Court was rejected in favor of
Denmark. Id.
42 See Environmental Policy Expected to Become Increasingly Important
in Trade Negotiations, 13 Intl Env. Rep. (BNA) 448 (Oct. 24, 1990)
("Environmental policy and the promotion of sustainable development will
play a central role in future international trade negotiations .... Tougher
U.S. standards could lead to bilateral trade disputes.").
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retaliation." Without the foreign aid component, the retalia-
tion would foster deep suspicions of bad faith in the developing
world.
The issue has recently presented itself in the United States
with respect to the anticipated free trade agreement between
the U. S. and Mexico. The concern of U.S. environmentalists
is that Mexico will become a dumping ground for toxic
wastes,' due to the use of hazardous substances and improp-
er disposal. Likewise, U.S. labor organizations have reason to
fear job losses to countries with lower environmental stan-
dards, such as Mexico.45
A reverse kind of environmental dumping is also practiced
by industrialized countries. It consists of shipping contaminat-
ed products to, or establishing environmentally destructive
processes in, less developed countries.46 For example, the
Commonwealth of Independent States fears that it suffers
from severe environmental destruction due to the influx of
capital-rich Western businesses in search of lax environmental
regimes.47 This parallels the Mexican fear of foreign enter-
"3 See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text for a further discussion
of the European proposal.
"" See Linda Diebel, Powerful Congressman Offers Conditional Support,
Continental Free Trade Gets a Boost, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 31, 1991, at H2
(reporting on the free trade agreement and the concerns of consumer activist
Ralph Nader that Maquiladoras will become sites of environmental
degradation).
"" For example, manhole covers are no longer made in the U.S. because
air pollution regulations are so strict that foundry work is not profitable for
such items. U.S. manhole covers are now made in Mexico and India. See
Communism's Polluted Legacy, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, July 18, 1990.
"' See Divora Ben Shaul, Environmental Dumping, JERUSALEM POST,
Apr. 29, 1991 (including Israel, Africa, Asia, and South America as places
where canned tuna with excessive quantities of dolphin meat, chlorofluoro-
carbon ("CFC") propellants, and pesticides can be exported; identifying
Cameroon and Thailand as recipients of contaminated food from the
Chernobyl nuclear facility disaster; describing Jordan's receipt of a
shipment of contaminated meat from Ireland with a radiation level far in
excess of amounts permitted in Europe).
"' See id. The kinds of projects that alarm Eastern bloc environmental-
ists include: a $10 billion venture by Chevron Corporation to explore for oil
near the Caspian Sea; a $6 billion plan to build the largest gas and chemical
complex in the Eastern Hemisphere near Guriev in Kazakhstan, which
environmentalists say can produce Chernobyl-sized disaster, and a $5 billion
agreement to build five large petrochemical complexes in West Siberia to
make plastics and other oil-based products. Environmentalists, economists,
and residents contend that this area has already been ravaged by the oil
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prises thoughtlessly turning the country into a toxic waste site
for the price of accelerated economic development. This
anxiety was reflected in President Salinas' political decision to
shut down an enormous Pemex facility in 1991 for environ-
mental reasons. Salinas' action was an apparent display of
force to the Mexican populace that Mexico's environmental
degradation will end, notwithstanding the free trade negotia-
tions now underway with the United States.4
There are some instances where mining can have trans-
boundary effects, such as acid rain deposition or the infusion
of toxins into shared rivers and the sea. These cases are
important, but are not considered in any detail in this Article.
They either call for an analysis of legal rights and duties
between nations' or complicated questions of how one
manages the so-called "global commons" such as clean air and
water.
3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Developing countries are busily extracting mineral resourc-
es.5" They do so in large measure to keep up with insatiable
and gas industry. For example, the Ob River has been ruined by oil spills,
and another 45 rivers in the area are sick or dead. Further, a tourist
complex at Lisii Nos on the Gulf of Finland, north of Leningrad, sits atop
fresh water that could become an alternative water supply to the city's
polluted reserves. See also Patrick Lee, Soviet 'Greens'Force Delays in Big
Oxy Project, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 7, 1990, at D1 (reporting that
Occidental Petroleum, a U.S. company, delayed its plans to enter into ajoint
venture to build a chemical plant in the Ukrainian town of Kalush, 250
miles southwest of Kiev, due to environmentalists' pressure).
4' See Juanita Darling, Air-Fouling Mexico City Refinery Closed, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at 3.
"" For arbitration as a solution, see Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A.
1905 (1941). The right economic solution in these cases may be to place the
duty to control the harm on the party which can do so at the least cost. See
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970).
'o See generally WORLD RESOURCE INST. & U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME,
WORLD RESOURCES 305-21 (1989); Ayesha Dias, supra note 27, at 2-3
(discussing the reasons for the pace of mining in the developing world). Ms.
Dias is an Associate Economic Affairs Officer with the Mineral Resources
Branch, Natural Resources & Environment Division/Department of
Technical Cooperation for Development of the United States. Note that
many viable mineral projects are not undertaken for lack of a suitor. This
is often caused by political risks perceived by outside investors, currency
difficulties, or other institutional barriers. Another significant statistic is
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debt service obligations associated with loans from the
industrialized world. The underlying problems are well
known, namely swelling populations, rising expectations with
respect to standards of living, migration of jobless people to
cities (and on occasion to frontier areas, as in the case of
Brazil), and a fundamental and massive flow of wealth from
developing countries to the industrialized countries.5 ' Other
reasons include the vulnerability of host countries to outsiders,
which is caused by the host countries' relative lack of sophisti-
cation in financial and industrial matters, and governmental
expediency or corruption.
Mining activity has its productive aspects, however. It
offers important employment opportunities, earns vital foreign
exchange, and if managed prudently, can lead to more
sophisticated "downstream" development, such as steel making
and manufacturing. These linkages may be valuable in
increasing economic independence. Moreover, gaining access
to the minerals often requires creating infrastructure such as
roads, bridges, and tunnels. That infrastructure can in itself
offer long-term benefits for the host country's economy.
Part of the trouble involves misapplied financial and public
policies that evolved in the developed countries. One involves
national income accounting. That is, extracting natural
resources reduces wealth while it produces income in the host
country. Nevertheless, the national income accounting process
reports mining production as a measure of income. This
anomaly arises because there is no equivalent of a national
balance sheet on which changes in net worth are recorded and
explained; even the most advanced countries lack such
accounts, because the expense of generating such statistics
would be tremendous. This anomaly helps drive economies in
the unsustainable direction of exploiting their natural resource
bases until their stocks are finally exhausted. One solution is
that developing countries accounted for only 26.7% of world mineral and
metals exports in 1989, while developed economies accounted for 64.7%. See
UNCTAD COMMODITY YEARBOOK (1991). Developing countries' share of
world production is significantly smaller because their production is less apt
to be exported; this does not, however, reduce the importance of mineral
production to the economies of developing countries.
", See ROBERT REPETTO, WORLD RESOURCE INST., PROMOTING ENVIRON-
MENTALLY SOUND ECONOMIC PROGRESS: WHAT THE NORTH CAN Do (1990).
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to exclude the value of extracted minerals as a measure of
gross national income; another is to treat pollution control and
other costs incurred to prevent environmental decay as
intermediate costs required in order to achieve a given level of
national income.5"
Another misapplied theory involves the process of discount-
ing future expenses. Modern theories of corporate finance
evaluate projects in light of the discounted present value of
cash receipts and disbursements over the period of the
project."' The basic theory is that a dollar today is worth less
than a dollar tomorrow. Because money is spent and received
at different times, it is necessary to discount (reduce) the value
of future cash receipts and disbursements over the life of the
project to the extent they are anticipated in later periods.
This permits an objective evaluation of whether the project is
expected to make money over the span of its entire life. It is
a powerful tool for evaluating financial investments.
The trouble is that this kind of reasoning has spilled over
into the making of government policy in the United States and
elsewhere, including the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank. If discounting techniques are used, the
effect is to minimize or eliminate what are in fact serious long-
term problems.54 For example, at a discount rate of only 2%,
a future liability of $1 million has a value of $500,000; this is
1900 times larger than the discounted present value at a 10%
discount rate. To put it another way, an ecological loss of $1
million at 10% in 100 years has a present cost of $75. The
policy implication is that one can virtually ignore the loss of
biological diversity55 and global climate changes because they
are so far off in the future. Repetto's proposal is to use a low
discount rate for project costs and benefits, and then screen
", Id. at 3. Repetto reports that the World Bank, the UN, OECD, and
certain developing countries are moving in this direction, but considers the
pace too slow.
5 See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261
(1958); for a textbook version of this and related subjects, see RICHARD
BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed.
1988).
64 The World Bank reportedly uses a 12 percent rate. Id.
" In fact, the loss of information on genetic materials and medicinally
valuable plants may prove to be a significant loss in the short-term.
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projects by requiring a high ratio of discounted benefits to
discounted costs.5" This compromise is an improvement, but
it still calls for finding the "right" discount rate when it may
be inherently wrong to use any discount rate.
3.1 Intergenerational Inequity
The present generation can violate the interests of future
generations in at least four ways: (1) they can consume the
higher quality resources, which leads to higher real prices in
the future; (2) they can cause uncorrected environmental
degradation; (3) they can consume resources not yet identified
as valuable to the present generation, or they can consume
resources prior to the discovery of their best use; and (4) they
can exhaust resources, resulting in a narrower range of
available natural resources. The latter two are most likely to
be irreversible. 7 These actions clearly constitute appropria-
tions from future generations, and most people can quickly
sense the unfairness of the results. A rigorous way to identify
the ethical issue is to start with the philosopher Rawls' view
that to understand intergenerational equity one must assume
the perspective of a generation placed along a spectrum of
generations, but not knowing where it is located.58 This
perspective does not prefer one generation over another and
ought to obliterate discounting practices because in effect it
eliminates any justification for impoverishing future genera-
tions. One need only think about the dilemma of safely
disposing spent nuclear material to understand that short-
term discounting practices are out of step with Rawls' view of
appropriate policy-making with respect to the environment and
the force of his ethical vantage point.59
6 REPETTO, supra note 51, at 3.
7 See WEISS, supra note 3, at 6. Preservation of soil between genera-
tions is a subject that has received the attention of the world community.
See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., supra note 2 (recommending that the
world's soil base should be treated as inventories in accordance with best
use, and that such use should determine incentives and disincentives for use
of particular soil areas).
r' JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
5' To the extent that intergenerational equity means returning the
natural environment to the same condition in which it was found, mining
is inherently in conflict with that value, because it involves taking. Unless
mining is accompanied by recycling, the norm simply cannot be met. That,
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If a country fails to force its mine operators to internalize
the costs of environmental degradation and worker's health,
then the minerals are purchased at an inappropriate discount.
In turn, manufacturers buy the processed minerals at unrealis-
tically low prices, and consumers purchase bargain-priced
products. The result is excessive global output and consump-
tion of the particular mineral. This also leads to more rapid
exhaustion of the host country's mineral stock than would
otherwise occur. Moreover, underpricing of mineral production
discourages whatever recycling would occur if prices reflected
full costs. The outcome is ethically unacceptable, and, as is
discussed later, produces what microeconomists refer to as a
"market failure."
The winners consist primarily"0 of the present generation
of importers and consumers of the mineral output, as well as
the present generation of citizens of the host country. The
latter enjoy the economic benefits that flow from increased
national employment, deferral of fiscal charges to pay for
environmental degradation, and deferral of austerity programs
imposed by international lenders in connection with restruc-
turing foreign indebtedness.61 Those debts may, of course,
however, is a different and even more troubling topic than the one at hand.
60 Anomalous situations occur in the case of individuals who temporarily
reside in the country of importation, and third country firms that sell
supplies to the mining operators, but who do not otherwise enjoy the fruits
of excessive world output.
1 For recent examples of International Monetary Fund ("IMF")-imposed
austerity programs, see George Black, Walesa Should Look Twice at His
Blessings; What IMF Austerity Measures Have Wrought in Latin America Is
a Stark Example for Poland, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1991, at M5 (In
discussing Poland's acquiescence to IMF restrictions on the Polish economy,
Black, the foreign editor of the Nation, comments that "[a] decade of the
fund's austerity programs, for example, have had about the same effect on
Latin America as the U.S. Air Force did on Iraq, reducing per-capita
incomes to 1976 levels."); Dominican Republic Strike Starts; 2 Killed, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 14, 1990, at 12 (Reporting that government security forces
opened fire on protesters at the start of a two-day strike over government-
imposed price increases; stores, factories and government offices were
closed, and most public transportation was halted. In addition, gasoline
prices rose by 83.6 percent, flour by 95.8 percent and sugar by 75 percent,
after President Joaquin Balaguer lifted government subsidies as part of an
austerity program recommended by the IMF.) These restructurings are now
an essential element of the international economy. See Steven M. Cohen,
Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin American Debt Revolu-
tion, 10 U. PA. J. INTL BUS. L. 89 (1988).
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have been incurred in part by prior generations.
The losers consist of future generations of citizens of the
host country and the mine workers in the current generation
who suffer unavoidable health damages.6 2 The future genera-
tions face the prospect of premature exhaustion of their
country's natural resources and the costs associated with a
fouled environment. It seems self-evident that this is a
morally indefensible result from the perspective of virtually
any environmental ethic."3 Aside from aesthetic losses,
future environmental costs fall into numerous categories,
including mortality and morbidity caused by diffusion of toxic
wastes into the general environment, loss of agricultural and
timber land, erosion, and the need to pay for continued
impoundment of mining wastes and proper mine closings,
which includes land reclamation. In theory, it is possible to
balance higher real prices of resources in the future with
greater wealth passed on to future generations." While this
is true in principal, few people would argue that this is a
current norm in developing countries. Rather, mining is
commonly a means of national economic survival from moment
" Avoidable health damage should be prevented through health-related
laws and regulations. Most health problems fall into the avoidable category,
but not all. Black lung disease of coal miners (pneumoconiosis) is evidently
unavoidable, but can be mitigated by protective measures such as wearing
masks.
" The topic of intergenerational inequity has been addressed in a
number of ways. One leading school of thought views the present genera-
tion as persons holding their rights in trust for future generations, while at
the same time standing in the position of beneficiaries. This view adapts
these fiduciary concepts to intergenerational obligations. See WEISS, supra
note 3; Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Genera-
tions, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 198 (1990). Another view is transcendental, rather
than scientific and rational. See Davis, Ecosophy: The Seduction of Sophia?,
8 ENvTL. ETHICS 151 (1986). Another school of thought would assign legal
interests, but not rights, to nonhuman entities, with different rules for
different classes of entities. See CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND OTHER
ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND
COUNTY ALMANAC (1949) (an earlier criticism of the adverse impact of
exaggerating rights of individuals vis-&-vis nature). Another view tries to
assign values according to the relative importance of each element of the
ecosystem. See Holmes Rolston, Is There an Ecological Ethic, reprinted in
ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 41-54 (Donald Scherer & Thomas Attig eds.,
1983).
64 See Joseph Stiglitz, A Neoclassical Analysis for the Economics of
Natural Resources, reprinted in ScARcITY AND GROWTH RECONSIDERED 33-66
(V. Kerry Smith ed., 1979).
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to moment, leaving little to pass on to the future. The critical
problem, then, is how to create appropriate policies and
encourage proper management of mineral resources, as
opposed to ceasing production.
If one looks at all aspects of mining in developing countries
in the aggregate, it is generally unnecessary to select any one
of the theories of intergenerational equity as the best, because
the adverse impacts of mining tend to be so obvious in terms
of depleting natural resources and polluting the environment.
However, special cases do exist, but those cases are not the
subject of this writing. This Article focuses on identifying the
regrettable cases and proposing solutions.
The important unresolved ethical question involves the
difficult areas that do not directly impinge on the health and
wealth of future generations, especially the loss of biological
diversity and natural beauty. One could in theory appraise
the value of these aesthetic losses by attempting to determine
what future generations would bid to reverse these losses.
One quickly recognizes, however, that such appraisals are
hopelessly impossible, even if one modifies the standards for
making the appraisal by requiring the imaginary appraisers to
take into account "moral reflection."6 The subject is just too
controversial, and the moral guidance is presently too faint in
history. It seems best that these factors should not be
included in the implicit costs of mining for purposes of
implementing the proposal set forth in this Article. If and
when humanity can agree on such elegant worldwide ethical
questions, it can be more ambitious in this regard.
Putting the current state of affairs in the most adverse
light, one can view the situation as a tacit conspiracy between
the present generation of opportunists in the host country and
" This theory of adding a morally correct "shadow price" is the work of
Professor Stone. He argues that microeconomists have a moral blind spot
in that they willingly undervalue the benefits of unpriced resources.
Microeconomists generally reject this concept because it invokes the now
discredited principle of cardinal ranking, that is, ranking consumer
preferences by reference to ultimate values, as opposed to ordinal ranking,
which calls for relative ranking only. The concept of cardinal ranking is
considered too intellectually "soft" by modern microeconomists and evidently
has been repudiated. See PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90-93 (1983).
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amoral purchasers of the mineral product,"6 both plotting
against future generations of the host country.
Members of the present generation of "conspirators" in the
host country may reply that they are in fact passing on value
to future generations in such forms as schools, hospitals, and
other national infrastructure or that they are victims of prior
generations' neglect. This argument has a number of weak-
nesses. First, the present generation is also wearing out
infrastructure, and it too may have taken advantage of, e.g.,
educational systems created by prior generations. Second, the
current generation's behavior with respect to pricing environ-
mental goods still falls below international environmental
norms, which is a sufficient reason to require a pay-as-you-go
approach. Third, it is a universally accepted expectation that
every generation will produce infrastructure for the benefit of
posterity; this expectation will be imposed on the host
country's future generations, along with paying the deferred
clean-up and hospitalization bills. Thus, the current genera-
tion is doing nothing special when it uses savings to produce
and repair national infrastructure. Finally, to the extent that
the current generation is making extraordinary payments for
infrastructure, retiring old national indebtedness, or suffering
from prior generations' neglect, the burden should be on the
proponent (i.e., the present generation) to prove the claim,
otherwise it becomes a facile escape hatch that will eliminate
these important economic and moral considerations.
The current generation of citizens in the host country may
instead simply declare that it has to defer paying its share of
environmental liabilities because the country cannot afford to
pay these obligations in full. This may be true in the sense
that the country is insolvent and faces severe national
unemployment such that the only immediate issue the country
can tackle is how to most rapidly expand its mining industry.
Bolivia perceives itself to be a case in point."' Telling such
countries that they must comply with international environ-
mental norms will most certainly be received as intolerable
preaching.
s6 The purchasers are a broad group, including consumers of the end
product and even the paid waste removers.
67 Guillermo Cortez, Assessor, Bolivia's Ministry of Mines and Metallur-
gy, Address at the Berlin Conference (June 1991).
1992]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
3.2 Unsustainable Development
This portrayal of the facts is mild. It does not take into
account the actual exhaustion of the minerals in the ground.
That is the subject of a separate body of microeconomic
analysis, which in itself poses complicated ethical issues. 8
For a great number of countries mining is a doomed activity.
Eventually, many countries will deplete their stocks of mineral
wealth without establishing alternative industries ot agricul-
ture, leaving large impoverished populations with nowhere to
turn for their livelihoods.6 "
This is anything but the kind of "sustainable development"
that the influential Bergen Declaration7 advocated, except
to the extent that the mineral product is permanently recycled.
The Bergen Declaration did not carefully define sustainable
development. Typical Third World mining is inconsistent with
a generally accepted definition of economic income, namely
that the maximum amount that can be consumed in the
current period is that amount which does not reduce potential
future consumption." For many developing countries,
mining activities are perilously similar to addictive drugs that
68 See generally JUAN MARTINEZ-ALIER, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS (1987)
(A review of intergenerational equity analyses, and a discussion of the Gray-
Hotelling theorem on intergenerational price and exhaustion paths based on
varying assumptions about discount rates).
" Some contend, however, that rapid extraction is acceptable because it
will lead to generations of wealth and will promote development. Rapid
extraction will result in the substitution of materials for minerals in short
supply. Further, it is argued that current low mineral prices imply that
there will not be increasing scarcity. See THOMAS DEGREGORI, THE THEORY
OF TECHNOLOGY (1985). Also, it is at least arguable that (1) royalties
account for the diminution in wealth caused by extraction, and (2) if there
is no extraction, the host country is correspondingly impoverished. The
latter is especially true if the mineral may become obsolete in the future.
0 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the EC
Region (May 16, 1990), in REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRON-
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1987) [hereinafter Bergen Declaration]. See
David A. Wirth & Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal-
Multilateral Agreements on Greenhouse Gases, in WORLD RESOURCE INST.,
GREENHOUSE WARMING: NEGOTIATING A GLOBAL REGIME 13, 16-18 (1991)
(summarizing the Bergen Declaration). The Bergen Declaration contains a
joint statement of Ministers from thirty-four countries expressing a series
ofjoint commitments, including proactive efforts to eliminate environmental
risks (as opposed to waiting for crises to emerge), a drive for sustainable
energy consumption, and industrial production aspirations.
71 See REPETTO, supra note 51, at 3.
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ultimately render the user impoverished and exhausted. One
difference is that with addictive drugs, the drama plays out in
one lifetime; with imprudent mining practices, the drama
spans several generations, with inconsistent amounts of
pleasure or suffering among the generations.
3.3 The Market
Regardless of the mining operation form, individual mining
enterprises are generally "price takers," that is, the price of
production is set by market forces with reference to the price
reported on a metals exchange.7" The usual locus is the
London Metals Exchange,"3 but sometimes exchange occurs
through direct negotiations with a large buyer. For example,
Japanese buying consortiums negotiate their long-term supply
contracts at prices that vary from the London market rate. An
example is the Japanese pattern of buying gypsum from
Thailand and China. One implication of these price mecha-
nisms is that if the cost of mining rises for a particular mine
operator, there is no mechanism whereby the operator can
raise its price to include the increased cost.74
3.4. Who is to Blame?
The dialogue between "North" and "South" can quickly
become rancorous, because both sides have firmly held beliefs
in their viewpoints, and both groups have justifiable objections
to the other's actions. To the North it seems clear that its
mining standards are higher than those of the South, and that
if the South would control its burgeoning population and rapid
urbanization, the relentless pressure on its mineral base would
" See, e.g., Robin Paley, Australia: Hawke Hoists the Storm Sail, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 30, 1987, at 1 (describing Australian mining
industries as price takers).
" There are other markets as well, such as the Commodities Exchange
("COMEX7) in New York and the Penang tin market. The markets tend to
be used for hedging purposes by mining buyers and suppliers. Some metals
(e.g., iron) are not priced on an international exchange.
74 Conversely, in a period of declining prices, major buyers have
attempted to avoid unfavorable long-term contracts. For example, Japanese
buyers have attempted to avoid such liabilities in Canada in recent years
with respect to coal supply contracts. Telephone Interview with Chris
Hinde of the Mining Journal Ltd.
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drop sharply.
The South can point out that mining reflects the North's
insatiable appetite for consumer goods. Further, any offer on
the North's part to make advanced environmental technology
available is an offer of continuing economic addiction. In
addition, the South can argue that its absolute contribution to
pollution is trivial compared to the North's, and that there are
strong cultural and religious pressures in favor of large
families.
The best way to overcome this impasse might be to try to
isolate the issue and to rest the case on economic theories that
have nothing to do with national mores.
A neutral way to frame the issue is to ask if there is a way
one can coax countries into paying for environmental liabilities
on a current basis, thereby assuring an orderly world market-
place for minerals and, to that extent, an equitable distribu-
tion of the intergenerational benefits and burdens of mining
operations? I believe that the most unassailable approach
begins with a microeconomic evaluation.
4. MICROECONOMIC EVALUATION
Microeconomists have their own way of looking at the issue
of deferred costs. Their conclusions are important in framing
the policy debate over how to handle environmental issues
from a legislative perspective, and the graphic exposition of
their analysis is straightforward. The following paragraphs
synthesize this important analysis and the central concept of
"market failure."75
Microeconomic analysis concentrates on small models in
order to study consumption, production, and pricing of goods
and services. The usual focal point is the behavior of business
firms. The general assumptions are that every firm and
consumer is a rational profit maximizer, and that in a
smoothly functioning market7 8 firms will produce goods until
"' Circumstances leading to an inefficient market are termed "market
failures." Two Nobel Prizes have been awarded in part for proof that an
efficient allocation results from laissezfaire economics, provided that certain
assumptions are met. The Nobel Prize recipients were Kenneth J. Arrow
(1972) and Gerard Debreu (1983).
76 These assumptions are commonly untrue, and there are various
analytical adaptations to such assumptions. The variations caused by
[Vol. 13:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss2/1
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
the marginal cost of the last good produced equals the price it
can command."' Outside the firm, there is a so-called de-
mand curve for each good. The curve shows the quantity of a
good that consumers will purchase at any given price per unit.
Each producer has a unique supply curve, which shows the
quantity of a good that the producer will provide (supply) at
any given price per unit. The supply curve is derived from
each producer's marginal cost curve. Again, the price of the
last good produced will equal its marginal cost.
Profit maximizing firms will not voluntarily pay to replace
common goods, such as clean air,"8 that they appropriate or
degrade. These destructive appropriations of common goods
are known as "externalities.""' The legal liability system is
not sophisticated enough to attribute pollution to each source
and to impose damages. For example, quantifying damages
arising from multiple sources can be nettlesome.
Open access to these common goods means that the full
costs of pollution are not included in the cost of production.
Thus, market prices do not accurately reflect such costs. The
result is greater than optimal levels of production and
consumption, an outcome referred to as a "market failure."0
4.1. Tax on Output to Cure Market Failure
A dryly logical solution to market failures is to impose a
tax on production that forces the price of the product up to the
level it would have been at if the full costs of environmental
externalities had been included. Once the output is "fully
priced," consumption and production will fall to the "correct"
imperfect markets are not important to this Article.
" The marginal cost refers to the extra cost of producing an extra item
of output. Marginal revenue refers to the extra revenue generated by an
extra unit of production that the firm sells. The marginal cost curve
produces the so-called supply curve. See generally J.R. GOULD & C.E.
FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY (5th ed. 1980).
" See generally E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities:
An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1971).
"' An externality may be benign, too. People who plant flowers that are
enjoyed by neighbors is a common example.
80 See Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON.
351 (1958) (a seminal article in this area).
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level in a smoothly functioning free market economy.8 " Full
pricing ought to include all of the damages incurred, not just
the cost of avoiding the damages. Using only the cost of
avoiding damages 2 is unsound because it is completely
irrelevant to the actual costs imposed on society as a result of
the damages inflicted. On the other hand, the underlying
assumption that the amount of damages can be quantified is
generally unrealistic.
In fact, no country would ever voluntarily impose such a
tax on its own mineral output." Rather, the tax is an aca-
demic concept that isolates the nature of the specific problem
and implies other solutions in an objective way."
The following graph illustrates a single firm's marginal cost
curve and the demand curve for the product. The vertical axis
is price per unit. The horizontal axis is the number of units
produced. These curves are not immutable, because both
supply curves and demand curves can vary over time with
such factors as tastes and technological change.
81 See generally Hearings, supra note 13, at 109-11 (statement of the
Environmental Defense Fund submitted by Daniel J. Dudek et al.).
82 Sweden has opted for the latter course in imposing its tax on carbon
dioxide emissions because it considered the process of measuring damages
impossible. SFS 1990:587.
8 The closest analog is perhaps the Canadian tax on timber exports to
the United States. The tax was supposed to counteract alleged Canadian
subsidies to its industry. Under a memorandum of understanding, dated
December 31, 1986, Canada agreed to impose a 15% tax on exports of
softwoods to the U.S. If Canada failed to impose the tax, the U.S. would
have instantly imposed an identical tax on such imports from Canada. The
U.S. argued that the timber was harvested at bargain rates from Canadian
public lands, producing a de facto subsidy. The agreement between the U.S.
and Canada stated that the tax could be repealed once the subsidies were
lifted. Canada has since eliminated the tax, asserting that the facts have
changed. See Canada Ending Tax On Lumber, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991,
at Di.
4 See generally A. MYRICK FREEMAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY (1973).
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P2
P1
Q1 Q2
If the firm appropriated a common resource to the detri-
ment of others, and if it were accurately assessed damages for
doing so, then its price per unit would rise. The following
graph shows a second, higher curve that accurately reflects full
cost pricing.8 5 This graph represents the microeconomically
"correct" level of output in light of pollution damages. The
new equilibrium at Q1/P2 would correct the market failure.
P2
P1
Q1 Q2
The second curve is often referred to as the "social margin-
"' In reality, accurate full cost pricing is difficult to determine because
of the uncertainty associated with ascertaining the precise amount of
damages. See Zvi Adar & James M. Griffin, Uncertainty and the Choice of
Pollution Control Instruments, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON.. & MGMT. 178-88 (1976).
The tax can be set at a level that reflects damages done (to the extent it is
possible) or it can be set at the cost of controlling pollution (e.g., the cost of
installing scrubbers). In several instances, Sweden has chosen the latter
course because of the difficulty associated with measuring damages.
Calculating damages is so difficult because it includes such imponderables
as the implicit cost of extinguishing a species.
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al cost" curve because it includes the full price to society.
The tax should be set at P2 minus P1. The tax revenues
equal (P1 minus P2) multiplied by Q1. The higher the social
cost and the less "elastic" the demand curve, the higher the
revenues. Elasticity refers to the sensitivity of the relation-
ship between the amount purchased and the price of the item.
Elasticity is most extreme when the demand curve appears
almost fiat. Whatever the degree of elasticity, the result of the
tax will be to reduce production and consumption.
There is a special problem in the mining industry. The
price of the mineral product is generally established by free
market forces on the London Metals Exchange. 6 Increasing
the cost of a mineral to a single producer does not give that
producer the opportunity to sell fewer products at higher
prices. Rather, it cuts the producer's profit margin.
Economists do not have dogmatic rules as to how society
should use the hypothetical tax revenue. There are several
possibilities: (1) dedicate the revenues to repairing the
damages; (2) use the revenues in the most efficient manner
that the government can discern; or (3) pass the revenues on
to future generations that will have to pay for the actual
damages. This ambivalence about the use of the revenues
shows that increasing the price without repairing the damage
does not in itself assure significant environmental benefits; it
only cures the "market failure." Deciding how to use tax
proceeds is a political question, unrelated to the concept of
market failure, but in reality the use of environmental taxes
is very important indeed. If such taxes are not held and used
for remedying the environment, the intergenerational impact
is likely to be unacceptable.
5. DISCUSSION
Mandatory internalization of the full costs of mineral
production would have important salutary results. It would
eliminate two intergenerational inequities: accelerated
exhaustion of the mineral wealth of future generations, and
the deferral of health and environmental costs into the future.
Arguably, fixing the price on the London market evidences a market
that is not free. Conversely, the breadth of the market and its presumably
adequate regulation lends credibility to a contrary conclusion.
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At the same time, it would eliminate the windfall to importers
of cheap minerals and downstream users, including current
consumers. In addition, in some cases it would shift extraction
to other, less environmentally destructive, mineral products or
mining processes."s This would result in actual economic
efficiencies in the sense that the extracted minerals would
have the least real cost all other things being equal. Certain
mineral products and mining processes would no longer enjoy
artificially low extraction costs with concealed long-term costs.
There are, however, cases where a rigid application of these
principles would result in great hardship. Again, Bolivia
furnishes an example where the microeconomically correct
result cannot be achieved unless it is accompanied by interna-
tional assistance. This relief for hardship cases is realistic; a
proposal that does not contain such relief is likely to be
unacceptable to the world community.
Donors of international assistance may raise some delicate
questions with respect to assistance. For example, should such
aid be linked to efforts at population control, since a principal
cause of the overexploitation of mineral resources is a burgeon-
ing population that cannot find employment in other sectors?
Should aid be restricted if the country would not otherwise
receive aid because its government engages in human rights
violations? The details for determining when a hardship exists
and how to identify donors are discussed later."8
5.1. Relation to Polluter Pays Principle
The full cost pricing proposal is consistent with the
"polluter pays" principle adopted by OECD members.8" The
87 Likewise, there is a policy choice between full cost pricing plus
remediation versus prevention. Another form of environmental tax, not
discussed in this paper, can in theory be used to force remediation by
making it cheaper for the firm to avoid environmental damage than to pay
the tax.
58 See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
s' This principle was adopted in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development's ("OECD's") "Declaration on Environmental
Resources for the Future." ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv.,
Declaration on Environmental Resources for the Future, in OECD AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 19, 20 (1986)[hereinafter OECD Declaration]. The organiza-
tion is the result of a treaty among the countries that are typically thought
of as the industrialized world. The OECD has commissioned several studies
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principle is also legally in force as official EC policy.9 0 That
principle calls for governments to avoid granting subsidies to
polluters and instead to internalize environmental costs.9
The central concept is that the polluter should bear the costs
of measures to reduce pollution. These costs are decided upon
by public authorities in order to assure that the environment
is in an "acceptable state." For example, when the U.S.
proposed a surtax on imported oil to fund its federal clean-up
program, European trading partners strongly protested that
the tax violated the polluter pays principle because it imposed
a tax at a higher level on imported oil than on U.S. produced
oil. The issue was placed before the GATT Council, which
ruled that the U.S. was in violation of GATT. 2
There are limits to the polluter pays principle. The OECD
only encompasses a limited number of relatively prosperous
countries. Also, the principle is fairly weak in that it contains
significant exceptions."3 Nevertheless, as the number of
OECD signatories increases, and as general sensitivity to
environmental concerns mounts, the principle is likely to
of noncommand and control methods for controlling environmental damage.
See JOHANNES B. OPSHOOR & HANS B. Vos, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1989). See generally Sanford Gaines, The
Polluter Pays Principle: From Equity to Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 463 (1991).
o See OECD Declaration, supra note 89.
' Since then, it has lost its purely economic meaning and was implicitly
redefined to go beyond preventive measures agreed upon in advance.
92 See U.S. Oil Import Fee Under Superfund Law Inconsistent with
GATT Obligations, Panel Says, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 659 (July 19, 1987)
(U.S. oil import fee held inconsistent with GATT Article XXII.1). The U.S.
position was that the polluter pays principle was not germane because the
issue fell within the scope of GATT.
" According to Opshoor and Vos, exceptions to the polluter pays
principle apply if certain specified conditions are met. For example, this
principle is not applicable within limited well-defined transition periods. As
the authors point out, there are numerous ambiguities in applying this
principle, such as the meaning of the term "an acceptable state of environ-
ment," the length of transition periods, the treatment of administrative
costs, the acceptability of charges and grants, and so forth. In 1981 the
OECD Environment Committee reviewed a number of these ambiguities and
other problems and revised the concept to achieve more effective use of
policy instruments. The Committee concluded that polluters should bear the
costs of keeping environmental quality at some publicly determined level,
without normally relying on subsidies. OPSHOOR & VOS, supra note 89, at
27-28.
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increase in importance. Moreover, in this author's opinion it
is a worthy principle; it ought to be considered on its own
merits, regardless of OECD membership. It is fundamentally
appropriate, both as a moral and economic" matter, that
polluters should pay for the damages they cause. Adopting
this principle-even in the absence of a treaty obligation-
reduces suspicions about the seriousness of a nation's intent
to join the fraternity of countries that want to control environ-
mental degradation. It is important that no other major
environmental norm conflicts with the polluter pays principle.
5.2. The Problem of Socialist Countries
Full cost pricing is a difficult concept to apply if the host
country's economy functions with no direct price signals.
Centrally planned economies of such countries as Mainland
China depend on extraction, labor, and transportation direc-
tives, not on arm's length purchases, for monetary consider-
ation. 5 It is unreasonable to expect centrally planned
economies to change their fundamental suppositions in order
to accommodate a free market concept with respect to miner-
als. Moreover, it is unlikely that these countries could
reconstruct hypothetical prices of mineral output even if they
tried. The difficulties are too great. For example, the
depreciation of mining equipment is clearly a cost factor, but
if there are no records of the monetary cost of the equipment,
then there is no logical starting point for determining such a
cost. Conversely, labor costs are higher than their nominal
wage rates because they include a large social welfare compo-
nent, such as free medical attention and subsidized housing.
Fortunately, the situation is not hopeless. One way to
salvage this dilemma is to forego trying to reconstruct
nonexistent prices and instead to substitute the prices of
comparable minerals produced under similar engineering and
environmental circumstances in free markets. The U.S.
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") has long granted the Commis-
9' It forces the polluter to internalize the cost of its environmental
damage, which is consistent with the discussion of microeconomic theory
outlined above. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
" See generally ERNEST MANDEL, INTRODUCTION To MARXIST ECONOMIC
THEORY (1970); MARX ON ECONOMICS (R. Freedman ed., 1961).
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sioner specific authority to impose an arm's length price on
transactions among commonly controlled businesses."
Section 482 is accompanied by a plethora of regulations and
has a long and rather successful history. This section can
easily be adapted to the problem at hand.
One approach would be to use production costs in countries
with comparable economies as proxies for data on domestic
costs in Socialist countries. This would not be easy.
Another approach, which seems less satisfactory, is to
apply a variant of the theory of the "second best." This concept
presumes that markets are in reality imperfect, and that the
price of each good does not reflect its incremental cost (as
would be the case if perfect competition existed); as a result,
one cannot be sure in which direction prices need to move with
respect to a particular good in order to eliminate an inefficien-
cy.9 It might be possible to study the overall price level of
the country on the basis of those selective items that do carry
prices, including other exports. With this information, one can
evaluate whether the price of the mineral product seems
proportionate to the general price level. That is much easier
99 I.R.C. § 482 (1988). The section reads as follows:
Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or.among such organizations, trades, or
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment,
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses.
In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property
(within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with
respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the
income attributable to the intangible.
" Consumers therefore must look at relative prices in deciding whether
to buy goods. Thus, for example, if the entire economy is monopolistic,
relative prices may be in order, and there is no way to be sure whether
lower prices will really result in economic efficiency. See generally STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 16-17 (1982) (a good prose discussion
on this topic); R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the
Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57).
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said than done.
5.3. European Community Proposal
The European Community has considered this issue"' and
appears to support the idea of imposing import duties on
products produced under environmentally unacceptable
circumstances. 9 Evidently, the notion is to impose duties
that would operate as surrogates to proper internalization of
costs at the mining or manufacturing level; in effect, it is the
microeconomist's tax on output imposed at the international
border. The consequence should be to diminish the extent of
environmental dumping into the EC countries, while reducing
the incentive to operate at environmentally substandard levels.
5.4. Relationship to GATT
The concept of retaliatory duties raises questions under
GATT in the sense that it implies steeper import duties than
specifically negotiated under the GATT treaty. However,
GATT has no enforcement mechanism," and it may be that
,8 Ernst Ulrich von Weizsacher, Director of the European Institute for
Environmental Policy, Address at the Berlin Conference (June 1991). In
addition, the topic is likely to be discussed by the EC after the completion
of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
" See Parliament Calls for More Environmental Protections in Trade
System, 1616 European Rep. (European Info. Serv.) 7 (Sept. 26, 1990) (A
report that the European Parliament's External Relations Committee on the
Uruguay Round trade talks sought to postpone the negotiation of measures
to protect the environment until after a new international trading system
was agreed upon.). The report focuses attention on the practice of
environmental dumping," whereby contracting parties produce more raw
materials than the local environment can sustain in order to obtain
competitive prices on the world market. As to possible GATT initiatives to
protect the environment, the report recommends as a model the recent
London agreement amending the Montreal Protocol under which the
industrialized countries agreed to contribute to a fund to help developing
countries satisfy environmental norms with regard to the emission of CFC
gases. Id. The industrialized countries have agreed to place $160 million
in a trust fund for the benefit of less developed countries in order to provide
money for technology transfers to help with the transition away from CFCs.
Glenn Prankel, Governments Agree on Ozone Fund, WASHINGTON POST, June
30, 1990, at Al.
,* OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL
TRADE SYSTEM 65 (1985). Even access to the International Court of Justice
is barred.
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such duties can be justified on the grounds of being outside the
kind of discrimination that GATT is aimed at preventing (i.e.,
collectively destructive trade behavior). The purpose of GATT
has been described as follows:
The GATT agreement, including the remarkably
detailed commitment on tariffs that comprise the
"Tariff Schedules," fills many volumes of treaty text.
The "General Articles" of GATT comprise the basic
trade policy commitments of the contracting parties.
These articles, now numbering thirty-eight and covering
eighty or ninety pages of text (see Documentary Supple-
ment) contain a number of detailed rules and obliga-
tions designed generally to prevent nations from pursu-
ing "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies which would be
self-defeating if emulated by other nations. Consider-
ation of various of these GATT obligations will be found
throughout this book, particularly in Part II.1'
The purposes of an antidumping duty are to improve the
global environment and to impose intergenerational equity. It
is beyond the purposes of GATT to restrict such a policy. For
those who subscribe to the venerable doctrine cessante ratione,
cessat et ipse lex'" that should be enough.
If this doctrine does not render the GATT inapplicable,
there is always a technical escape under the security exception
located in Article XXI.' There is a seemingly more relevant
exception under Article XX.'O°
101 JOHN JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATION-
AL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 296 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
102 "Where the reason for the law ends, so does the law." See HERBERT
BROOM, BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS 126 (7th ed. 1900).
'03 GATT, supra note 40, at art. XXI. The key aspect of this exception is
that the party invoking it has carte blanche authority to subjectively
determine whether a national security risk exists. The United States was
the first to espouse this position, and it has been the rule ever since. See
Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, GATT Doc. CP.3/SR22
(June 8, 1949). A variety of anomalous, if not comical, results have been
supported by the GATT Council. The most extreme case appears to be the
Swedish use of the exception to defend import restrictions on certain
footwear. See GATT Doc. C/M/109 (1976) (the Swedish argument was based
on a limited stockpile of rubber for boots).
104 GATT, supra note 40, at art. XX. The text reads in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
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The key problem with the European antienvironmental
dumping duty is purely practical. The duties may be unen-
forceable because of the opportunities for evasion in the
international minerals markets. To take a simple case, if
Bolivian tin were extracted under unacceptable conditions, but
country X's tin were not, then Bolivian dealers could sell into
the X market, and the mining companies in X could sell to the
EC. These kinds of commodities exchanges occur frequently in
international markets.10 5 Moreover, transshipment at inter-
mediate ports of call on international shipping routes present
further opportunities for evasion. The situation is worse if
there are several mining firms in the country. How can voices
complaining of discrimination vis-h-vis other exporters be
sorted out thoughtfully on an objective basis? For example,
assume that there are two copper miners in a particular
country and only one is an environmental miscreant, how does
one confidently know that a particular shipment of copper
from that country is the product of the offending mineral
operator?
Second, there is the question of fixing the duty at the right
level. It is difficult to conjure up a tax on production to act as
a surrogate for full costing for a single firm. How can one
determine a duty for a number of countries, each containing a
multitude of mineral operators? How can the EC obtain the
facts needed to decide whether a duty is required, and if so, at
what level? Again, these are extremely difficult questions, and
they have the potential for generating hard feelings between
trading partners.
It appears that to date no such duty has been imposed.
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health ....
Id. Whether this provision will be interpreted to prevent "environmental
dumping" is a major uncertainty that looms in GAT's future. The trouble
with such an interpretation is that it is essentially patronizing in that it
substitutes the importer's judgment as to what is environmentally tolerable
for the exporter's judgment.
105 Often metal ingots (e.g., copper) have to be marked in order to be
saleable via the London Metals Exchange, but this does not prevent their
sale at a discount.
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Nevertheless, this kind of antienvironmental dumping duty is
likely to become a fairly common proposal in the future, as
enterprises in the industrialized world feel their profit margins
encroached upon by the costs of environmental compliance.
Another way to structure an antidumping duty would be to
couch it in terms of lowering tariffs for those countries whose
mining standards satisfy requirements imposed by the
importing country.1 Although the practical effect of either
system is the same, this proposed format is superficially less
offensive because it has the air of a prize based on good
behavior, as opposed to punishment for bad behavior.
Coming to a conclusion about whether an antienviron-
mental dumping system could in fact work is beyond the scope
of this writing. Suffice it to say that the concept of an import
duty to substitute for a domestic system that forces internal-
ization of costs is a good one conceptually, but there is a great
deal of room for pessimism about its practicability. The better
result would be to induce compliance at the mine operator
level. An international consensus must be reached that
concludes that full internalization of costs is required of all
mine operators as the right starting point for such compliance.
As a worldwide norm, and not one imposed by a privileged
group of importing countries, it could operate consensually on
a "grass roots" level, buttressed by ethical values. With that
kind of an institutional background, import duties could be a
backstop in extreme cases. The inherent right to impose such
duties in cases of noncompliance could be made part of the
international consensus.
5.5. Assistance
Many developing countries with chronic unemployment
have limited access to capital,"" and at present there is no
106 See Professor Thomas Waelde, Environmental Policies Toward Mining
in Developing Nations: Perspectives on the Future (1992) (available from
the author). Professor Waelde is the Director of the University of Dundee's
Center for Mineral and Petroleum Studies. Professor Waelde was formerly
a UN Interregional Advisor.
10 Such countries are on occasion referred to as "fourth world" (least
developed) in UN parlance. They include large countries with massive
foreign debts, whose debt service costs are a high proportion of their gross
national products. The U.S. maintains a list of about forty least developed
countries that fulfill certain standards, most notably low per capita income.
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special fund to assist them.' There will, therefore, be cases
where compliance with sound environmental norms cannot
realistically be achieved. Insisting that less developed
countries internalize the costs of proper mining activities will
appear as pontification of the worst sort. Under the proposal
advanced in this Article, countries that cannot realistically
correct their own situations would be able to turn elsewhere
for help. By forcing noncomplying countries to come forward
with requests for assistance, the paying countries have the
advantage of being able to demand practical evidence of what
the environmental problems really are, what help is needed,
and how much it would cost. This places the burden of proof
where it ought to be-on the party seeking exceptional
treatment.
As a matter of equity, the providers of international
assistance should be the parties that benefitted from the
historic underpricing of the mineral product. These beneficia-
ries primarily consist of the private owners of the mine,
importing countries, and countries that consumed the products
manufactured in the importing country.
There are other participants as well. They include the
handlers of the minerals, international shippers, suppliers to
the mine, suppliers to the importing country's industry that
converted the minerals, as well as accountants, lawyers,
consultants and other professionals who advised the mining
companies, the importers, and the manufacturers. These
people are generally very difficult to trace, and it is question-
able whether there is any chance of tracking them down. Even
if they could be located, such participants would probably
refuse to part with their earnings, regardless of the legal
structure established to implement the overall full costing
proposal. In most cases, there will never be satisfactory
attribution of benefits because the facts will be difficult to
establish. In ambiguous cases, countries that were identified
as importers may claim that their importers were mere
1 " The World Bank, the UNDP, and the UNEPjointly administer a large
new fund to assist in cases where pollution causes transboundary or global
environmental degradation, but the fundis not for purely internal problems.
In addition, the World Bank lends funds for environmental improvement,
but the loans are issued at standard rates, and the Bank generally does not
favor loans for retrofitting. Telephone Interview with Nicholas van Praag,
Advisor, World Bank (Oct. 17, 1991).
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transshippers, or that their industries added little value to the
market or operated at losses and were eventually closed down.
In such cases, the question presented is whether assistance
should be granted anyway, primarily because the country
seeking the aid will by then have made such a good case for
it-including a showing of great national deprivation. At this
point, the moral justification for the help will be well estab-
lished.
No request for bilateral assistance should be tendered
before private owners of the mine have made a maximum
contribution to remedying the problem. Thereafter, the burden
falls upon others to help. The country seeking assistance
should also be expected to show by means of national statistics
that it is unable to rectify the problem.
The assistance could take a number of forms. The simplest
would be a transfer of cash. Because the purpose of the full
internalization of environmental costs is to induce environ-
mental improvement, it would generally seem best to tie the
assistance to technology transfers that assure the mining site
is brought into compliance with environmental norms. In
some cases, however, cash transfers might be better. For
example, if the real problem is that the process is inexorably
injuring the miners, then the right form of aid would be cash
to support health services for them.
Technology transfers are not as simple as they seem. The
technology must be usable. That means it must be accompa-
nied by appropriate training and maintenance. The equipment
itself must not be too complex to manage effectively, and there
must be assurance of the availability of parts in later years.
Because of the uncertainties associated with determining the
appropriate technology, it seems prudent to assure that a
dispassionate observer participates in this part of the process.
One such observer might be a competent firm of consulting
engineers. Another could be the United Nations Environment
Programme.
One helpful group might be the personnel who report to the
Global Environmental Facility ("GEF"). GEF, which was
established in November of 1990, is designed to support
projects in developing countries in order to address global
warming, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and to
protect international waters. It implements its activities
through the UN Development Programme, the UN Environ-
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ment Programme, and the World Bank. Taken together, the
three entities compile a unique list of skills"° which should
be useful in administering the proposal set forth in this
Article. This group consists of a significant staff of experts,
but they may need further help depending on the circumstanc-
es.
There is another significant problem with transfers of
technology that is not often appreciated. Less developed
countries fear becoming too dependent on imported technology.
Acquiring the technology is expensive, but that is only the
beginning. The host country is dependent on the original
provider for spare parts, training, and upgrades. Meanwhile,
no domestic industry springs up to provide competing technolo-
gy. The value added from manufacturing the equipment stays
with the manufacturer. The buyer continues its role as a
genteel addict. In short, there is a strong case for technology
transfers, but its application must be sensitive. In sensitive
cases, cash grants in exchange for the host country's assurance
of remediation may be the better path.
5.6. Tax Surcharge in Importing Country
The countries of importation might want to impose a
remedial surtax on their industrial processors for the windfall
benefit of overproducing. Such a surcharge is a step in the
direction of curing the market failure, but it is a limited one
in the sense that it captures only a share of the profits. If the
unremedied environmental and human costs are so great that
the importing country's industries would be unable to earn a
profit, the surtax would have to be greater than any tax on net
profits.
Putting aside the difficulties of constructing the tax and
obtaining the data needed to fix it at the right level, the
political problems of targeting the tax on a small number of
domestic producers make its prospects unlikely. Nevertheless,
this surtax is an option, and it should operate as a defense to
host country requests for assistance with respect to periods
109 UNDP coordinates and manages project preparation and technical
assistance work. UNEP provides scientific and technological guidance in
identifying and selecting projects. The World Bank administers the fund
and is responsible for appraising and supervising investment projects. The
fund has over $1 billion at its disposal.
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during which the tax was in force.
6. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL
The centerpiece of the proposal is to make full cost pricing
of mineral products an international norm. The other seman-
tic expression is to force the mining firm to "internalize" all of
its costs. The principal corollary would be that in extreme
cases, where the host country needs foreign assistance in order
to comply, the first source ought to be the trading partner or
partners that benefitted the most from historical underpricing
of the mineral output. Noncompliance with full cost pricing
could justify retaliatory import duties.
There are probably a number of alternatives to the
following methods of implementation. If this Article's proposal
is accepted, the method of implementation must be considered.
The following proposals would never be adopted in toto, but
they nevertheless are a starting point from which policy
makers can disagree and perhaps negotiate a resolution.
6.1. United Nations Resolution
Only with a broad consensus can an essentially moralistic
proposal such as this one gain force in dealing with particular
cases. The first step is to get a broad consensus recognizing
that full internalization of costs is a proper norm, and that the
burden of assistance in the cases of ongoing projects should be
tied to historic benefits of underpricing. Due to the lack of any
other body, the right forum must be the United Nations,"'
and within the United Nations, the appropriate entity must be
the General Assembly, rather than some lesser body. The
consensus would be embodied in a resolution."' Such reso-
lutions are nonbinding. Many might prefer a treaty.
Hopefully, there is no need for a treaty. Ultimately,
treaties are voluntary documents, just like resolutions.
110 The UN has 159 members as of September 5, 1991. By contrast,
GATT has only 85. There is no other international organization whose
membership approaches these levels. Moreover, the UN has great prestige,
which adds to the weight of any collective understanding to which it is a
party.
"' Perhaps a declaration can be usedinstead. While declarations appear
somewhat more compelling, I leave this for others to consider.
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Moreover, treaties are notoriously tedious to develop. They
require detailed negotiations and invite country-by-country
exceptions and reservations. Resolutions, by contrast, tend to
be shorter and more general. A multilateral treaty would be
preferable if it could successfully grapple with the technical
issues posed by the norm, such as determining when there is
noncompliance in borderline cases, identifying historic
beneficiaries of underpricing, and assessing how much
assistance such beneficiaries should provide. However, it is
unlikely that the really difficult questions posed by the full
pricing norm could ever be worked out with precision. This
dilemma invites the more consensual approach of a resolution.
Such an agreement is consistent with the kind of collective
good faith that is needed in order to implement the present
proposal.
The arguments in favor of a treaty are that resolutions
have too little practical impact and fail to define definite
obligations of states. Also, if the scheme is to involve financial
duties, a treaty is of great value in inducing governments to
raise funds through domestic legislation. The treaty versus
resolution issue would ultimately be decided by diplomats.
The proposal should include a provision that favors the
existence of a multinational fund to cover those cases where
the developing countries need assistance and the beneficiaries
are too diffuse to identify an industrialized country that could
fairly be called upon to remedy the situation.
The resolution would not be limited to cases of malfeasance
with respect to existing mines. It should cover new mines as
well as existing mines." 2 There is no doubt that the best
approach to minimizing mining pollution is to make environ-
mental considerations an integral part of the process of
opening any new mine. This approach places a heavy burden
on developing countries to regulate artisanal and gold rush
112 In that connection, it would be sound to adopt the UN Economic and
Social Council's report Programme of Work on the Intergovernmental
Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and
Reporting: Discussion of Accounting and Reporting Issues Identified During
the Eighth Session, Accounting for Environmental Protection Measures,
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Economic and Social Council, U.N.
Doc. 91-04235 211f(E) (1991). The report emphasizes the need for
accounting procedures that assure that businesses take full account of their
environmental liabilities when reporting for financial purposes.
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mining practices. 1 '
EC countries will find this approach awkward because the
Treaty of Rome precludes them from imposing unilateral tariff
increases."" Accordingly, the EC members will not likely
participate in the resolution unless they reach a consensus on
this issue and on how to use the proceeds of such duties.
The resolution may be ignored or trivialized in practice. If
so, the next step is to promptly begin negotiating a treaty,
while standing by the resolution in the interim.
6.2. Notification
Assuming the norm is in place, the first issue would be to
accurately identify cases of noncompliance. That is not as easy
as it might seem. Although a mine site may accumulate slag,
the mine operator may be internalizing the costs of cleaning
up the site by setting aside reserve funds."5  Likewise,
substandard health conditions for miners can be offset by
health funds to pay for the consequences of such neglect.
There should be a free flow of initial information on
environmental violations in order to assure that the issue is
raised. The information could come from miners, local
populations, domestic or overseas competitors, and govern-
ment bodies. In the case of large and medium sized opera-
tions, competitors are especially motivated to inform on each
other and would generally have the wherewithal to provide
113 Morocco and Ghana have regulated such practices, and their strides
should serve as models to other countries.
114 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY arts. 12-
29.
"' One problem in this area is that reserve funds in governmental hands
are not necessarily free from the risk of encroachment. Likewise, funds in
private hands are also unsafe, and in some cases may even be subject to the
claims of general creditors. To deal with this problem, one concept raised
at the Berlin Conference was to have a multinational organization, such as
the World Bank, hold such funds, disbursing them only as needed. The U.S.
permits a current income tax deduction for accruals recorded to reserves for
closing and reclaiming mines and solid waste disposal sites. I.R.C. § 468A
(1988). The flaw with this approach is that additions to reserves are purely
bookkeeping entries. No actual fund need exist and no cash need be
transferred. By contrast, § 468 of the I.R.C. authorizes current deductions
for actual contributions to actual reserves established to fund shutdowns of
spent nuclear facilities. I& at § 468. The funds are in effect under joint
corporate and state control.
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useful information. However, in artisanal and gold rush
situations, it is unlikely that competitors would inform on each
other, as most of them would be out of compliance with the
norms. Domestic legislation can help in this area. For
example, the host country can enact laws which: (1) require
miners to post notices to workers describing minimum
environmental and health standards and advising on whom to
notify in the event of violations; (2) provide rewards to
informants;" 6 (3) assure anonymity of informants; and (4)
protect "whistleblowers" from employer retaliation, perhaps by
including attorneys' fees for obtaining damages as a result of
such retaliation.
6.2.1. Whom to Notify
This process is essentially one in which the industrialized
world tells the less developed countries how to go about their
business. Many less developed countries will find the concept
to be an offensive infringement on their sovereignty. This
consideration makes it important to give the host country
every opportunity to resolve its own environmental problems.
Respect for national sovereignty makes the national govern-
ment of the host country the first logical choice to receive
information on alleged noncompliance in its domestic mining
industry. Within the governmental structure, the information
should be disclosed to the environmental ministry, which
typically has jurisdiction in the mining field. 1
... In this regard, § 7632 of the I.R.C. furnishes an analogy. Id. at
§ 7632. This section grants rewards to informants of up to ten percent of
what the Internal Revenue Service extracts from the taxpayer as a
consequence of the information. It assures anonymity. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7623-1(e), (f) (as amended in 1973).
11 The membership list at the Berlin Conference indicates that
environmental authority over mining activities is most often lodged in the
mining ministry. In addition, health authorities may have separate
jurisdiction. The International Labor Organization advises on miners'
health and safety issues worldwide.
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6.3. Ministry Activity
Before focusing on how the ministry ought to act, it should
be noted that most mining ministries have a perfectly good
grasp on the mining activities within their countries. Their
problems arise in dealing with difficult situations with limited
resources and frustrations over law enforcement. 1 8
Regardless of the information's source, the ministry should
have a policy of openness towards such information. Ideally,
there should be an explicit path for possessing such informa-
tion, which should include a specific individual responsible for
such work. The ministry should evaluate the information to
the best of its abilities. It should reject information deter-
mined to be erroneous or trivial, and it should begin inquiry
into reliable information. With luck, the problem will
be pragmatically resolved at the mine operator level. Assum-
ing that the mining ministry concludes that the problem is
resolved in a manner that is consistent with the imaginary UN
resolution, should that end the investigation as a procedural
matter? Respect for local sovereignty argues for this conces-
sion, despite the risk of abuse. Moreover, it is impractical to
design a system that could function otherwise, given the
impossibility of forcing a bureaucracy to act when it considers
its job done. If a country or trading bloc felt that the
ministry's job was inadequate, it has the usual sovereign right
to protest diplomatically, and perhaps to ultimately retaliate
with an antienvironmental dumping duty or some other
coercive remedy.'
6.4. Request for Bilateral Assistance
If the host country is unable to rectify the problem for lack
of funds, it would seek the proportional assistance of the
country or countries that benefitted most from the underpriced
goods. This process would presumably be handled through
11 See, e.g., E. SCHANZE ET AL., supra note 16, at 216.
11 The legality of such economic coercion under customary international
law is unclear, but it seems that there is no established norm opposing such
conduct. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its
Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 625-26 (1974).
But cf. Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary
International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 411-13 (1985).
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diplomatic channels. An arbiter might be asked to validate or
reject the basis of the claims.
6.5. Request for Multilateral Assistance
This last step would be a ministry level request for
multilateral assistance. This sort of request would be possible
only after the host nation exhausted its other remedies and
found itself unable to pay for remediation. An appropriate
governing body would have to be established as an element of
the resolution.
7. CONCLUSION
Readers are likely to view this Article as idealistic. In fact,
it is nothing of the sort. It only offers a modest short-term
solution. Mining without recycling is an extremely risky
economic path that is entirely incongruent with the reasonable
concept of "sustainable development." Many developing
countries are on a road to suicide, as populations swell and
natural resources expire. Unfortunately, there seems to be no
real hope of changing the pattern. A worldwide consensus that
environmental clean-up costs should be attributed to those
who created the problems is more than a fig leaf, but it will
not divert the economic and human tragedies so many
developing countries face. For that, far more dramatic means
are needed.
In this era of free market theory domination, consistency
requires- that the free market adherents insist on full cost
pricing. A sense of fairness calls for leniency and assistance
in otherwise intractable cases. Failure to adhere to this
standard and to refuse to seriously address the issue on any
other ground is an unacceptable inconsistency.
1992]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
